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Article
“That is where peace begins . . . Your hopes must light the way 
forward. There will be many voices that say this change is not 
possible. . . . Sometimes, the greatest miracle is recognizing that 
the world can change.”
—U.S. President Obama, Jerusalem, 2013
Speaking to the citizens of Israel, this historical speech made 
by President Obama addresses the crucial need of renewing 
negotiations to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This 
conflict, one of the most pervasive conflicts in the world, 
serves as an example of a unique form of intergroup conflict 
referred to as intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013; Coleman, 
2003; Kriesberg, 1993, 1998). Intractable conflicts are a 
severe type of intergroup conflict, seemingly resistant to 
peaceful resolution over long periods of time, since both 
sides can neither win nor seem willing to compromise to 
achieve peace (Azar, 1990; Bar-Tal, 2013; Coleman, 2003; 
Coleman, Vallacher, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2007; 
Kriesberg, 1993, 1998). Intractable conflicts involve a num-
ber of unique characteristics, one of which encompasses the 
perception, held by all parties involved, that the conflict is 
irresolvable (Bar-Tal, 2007; Kriesberg, 1993), a belief which 
serves as fertile ground for a total loss of hope. Feelings of 
futility regarding the impossibility of achieving peace further 
feed into the conflict’s intractability by spreading despair 
among those who most need to maintain hope.
In this article, we propose the changing world hypothesis, 
a new way of inducing hope in intractable conflicts. We use 
a number of methodologies, adding to the understanding of 
hope, and ways it can be induced indirectly within intracta-
ble conflict.
Hope
According to Lazarus (1999), hope is an emotion that arises 
when visualizing a specific, meaningful goal in the future, 
leading to “a strong desire to be in a different situation than 
at present” (p. 663). This visualization is followed by affec-
tive associations and positive feelings regarding the specific 
future goal (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974; 
Snyder, 2000; Stotland, 1969). In terms of action tendency, 
hope has cognitive manifestations of thinking and planning 
ways to achieve the goal in question (Snyder, 1994, 2000; 
Staats & Stassen, 1985), and hope has been found to lead to 
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Abstract
The importance of hope in promoting conciliatory attitudes has been asserted in the field of conflict resolution. However, 
little is known about conditions inducing hope, especially in intractable conflicts, where reference to the outgroup may 
backfire. In the current research, five studies yielded convergent support for the hypothesis that hope for peace stems 
from a general perception of the world as changing. In Study 1, coders observed associations between belief in a changing 
world, hope regarding peace, and support for concessions. Study 2 revealed the hypothesized relations using self-reported 
measures. Studies 3 and 4 established causality by instilling a perception of the world as changing (vs. unchanging) using 
narrative and drawing manipulations. Study 5 compared the changing world message with a control condition during conflict 
escalation. Across studies, although the specific context was not referred to, the belief in a changing world increased support 
for concessions through hope for peace.
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cognitive flexibility, creativity, and risk taking (Breznitz, 
1986; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Isen, 1990). Thus, 
hope can be defined as a discrete emotion manifested by a 
forward-oriented cognitive appraisal of a situation as improv-
ing in the future.
The Role of Hope in Conflict Resolution
Previous studies regarding long-term conflicts have pointed 
toward hope as a crucial emotion needed to promote peace. 
Bar-Tal and colleagues (Bar-Tal, 2001; Jarymowicz & Bar-
Tal, 2006) discuss the conceptual importance of hope within 
the context of conflict resolution, because it involves con-
ceiving of new paths and behaviors toward the positively 
viewed goal of peace, including motivating people to hold 
conciliatory attitudes (see also Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, 
& Gross, 2014). In Northern Ireland, hope was found to be 
positively associated with a lower desire to retaliate, and a 
higher inclination to forgive the outgroup (Moeschberger, 
Dixon, Niens, & Cairns, 2005). Halperin and Gross (2011) 
found that hope regarding peace was associated with willing-
ness to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinians during the 
2008 Gaza war.
Altogether, these studies suggest that the experience of 
hope induces attitudes crucial for promoting conflict resolu-
tion. In addition, they suggest a relationship between future-
oriented, cognitive perceptions regarding change and the 
experience of hope. How then can perceptions of intractable 
conflict, perceived as inherently unresolvable, come to be seen 
as resolvable in the future? The answer may lie in an analysis 
of the cognitive appraisal leading to hope in conflict.
Promoting a Belief in a Changing World
Research has shown that hope (at least in intractable con-
flicts) involves a cognitive appraisal that the potential for a 
positive change regarding a specific situation exists (Cohen-
Chen et al., 2014). However, people and societies involved in 
the conflict adopt this perception of the conflict as stable and 
unchanging, meaning that it can never be resolved peace-
fully, and further feeding into its hopelessness. Thus, pro-
moting hope in intractable conflicts seems to be key in 
promoting attitudes for peace.
Nevertheless, in intractable intergroup conflicts inducing 
hope is by no means a simple task. Past research indicates 
that within intractable conflicts, and especially when the 
conflict is ongoing and supported by the collective narrative, 
direct reference to the outgroup can “backfire” by leading to 
inverse and negative reactions (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009). 
This can derive from negative emotions elicited by mention-
ing the outgroup, or from the feeling that one is expected to 
abandon the accepted narrative (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; 
Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 
2005; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009). Thus, any intervention that 
seeks to promote hope about the conflict’s future would not 
be able to mention the conflict without stimulating reactive 
negative affect and attitudes. How then to overcome this 
critical limitation in intractable conflict?
We believe a possible solution can be found by indi-
rectly changing specific conflict attitudes by promoting 
more general changes about how people see the world 
(Crisp, Birtel, & Meleady, 2011; Gross, 1998; Halperin, 
Cohen-Chen, & Goldenberg, 2014; Hewstone, 1996). We 
adopted this general perspective in developing our reason-
ing. Specifically, guided by our belief that an approach 
aimed at the core characteristics of intractable conflict is 
needed, we sought to change the perception of conflict as 
irreconcilable and the associated experience of hopeless-
ness. We argue that, given the cognitive grounding of hope 
discussed above and the need to avoid direct reference to 
the conflict, a perception of the world as dynamic and con-
stantly fluctuating opens the possibility for imagining a 
positive future of peace and experience hope within a pro-
tracted conflict, followed by peace-supporting attitudes. A 
static perception of the world, on the other hand, would 
serve to perpetuate the conflict and spread hopelessness, by 
making it impossible to envision a future situation that is 
different in the first place. In sum, promoting the perception 
that the world is ever-changing may be the essential ele-
ment that enables individuals to experience hope for peace 
and reconciliation. We therefore hypothesized that promot-
ing a belief in a changing world would turn into an increased 
experience of hope regarding peace in the specific conflict, 
prompting higher levels of support for attitudes toward 
peace-making (Figure 1).
The efficacy of transforming attitudes by changing gen-
eral mind-sets has been established in a large number of con-
texts in the form of implicit theories (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 
1997; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995; Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, 
& Mackie, 2007). Specifically in the context of conflict, 
research has shown that instilling a belief in malleability (of 
groups and conflicts) led participants to support conciliatory 
attitudes (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Halperin, Crisp, Husnu, 
Dweck, & Gross, 2012; Halperin, Russell, Trzesniewski, 
Gross, & Dweck, 2011). Such findings, although impressive, 
may raise a challenge in intractable conflicts. As stated, 
research suggests that removing interventions from the spe-
cific context can reduce negative emotions and attitudes in 
contexts of extreme conflict. Interventions involving implicit 
theories change perceptions regarding groups or conflicts in 
general, but they still focus on specific and salient constructs 
that may be too concrete and close to the actual situation (by 
referring to extreme groups or conflict situations), leading to 
backlash. Here we aimed to take this approach one step fur-
ther by developing a neutral (neither positive nor negative) 
and realistic (constant change) intervention about the world 
as changing. We hypothesized that this would serve to avoid 
backlash caused by specific cues about the conflict, and 
induce hope and conciliatory attitudes within the extreme 
context of intractable conflict.
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The Present Research
To test our Changing World Hypothesis, we conducted five 
studies in the context of the conflict between Israeli-Jews 
and Palestinians. This setting enabled us to test our assump-
tions regarding hope in the very real context of intractable 
conflict, aiming to provide a comprehensive empirical pro-
gram for intervention development. We adopted a multi-
methodological approach across studies to gain convergent 
support for our hypothesis. Study 1 examined the hypothe-
sized relationships using coded observations of archive 
materials. Study 2 was a correlational study that measured 
people’s self-reported belief in a changing world, hopeful-
ness regarding peace, and support for concessions toward 
peace. In Study 3, we experimentally manipulated a general 
belief in a changing world and measured its causal effect on 
specific hope regarding peace and support for concessions. 
In Study 4, we created an applicable educational interven-
tion, using an “association depiction task” to induce general 
belief in a changing world, followed by assessment of hope 
and support for concessions. Finally, in Study 5, we exam-
ined the effect of the changing world manipulation on hope 
and concession-making compared with a control condition.
Study 1: Observational
The goal of the first study was to examine whether people 
who are observed as holding a belief in the world as chang-
ing are also perceived to experience hope for peace in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict, as well as observed as supportive 
of concession-making outside of the laboratory environment. 
For this study, we used a unique sample and methodology, 
using archive materials and vivid documentation of Israelis 
describing their perception of the conflict’s future. Although 
these materials were not created or collected for academic 
purposes, we identified this opportunity to observe associa-
tions between dynamism, hope, and conciliatory attitudes 
using a real-life context.
Method
Participants and procedure. Videos were created as part of a 
project led by the One Voice Movement, an organization pro-
moting conflict resolution between Israel and the Palestin-
ians.1 We were given access to the organization’s database, 
which included 20 videos containing short interviews 
collected throughout the years 2009-2010 in various areas in 
Israel. Interviewees were addressed randomly and asked to 
be recorded answering the question “How do you imagine 
the future of the conflict in the year 2018?”
To assess these videos, six coders (4 women and 2 men) 
were recruited, using snowballing methods (Facebook post 
and email messages), and were offered US$25 in return for 
participation. Coders were merely required to indicate their 
interpretation of the interviewee’s state of mind, and what 
they perceived to be the interviewee’s attitudes from the 
video. However, to ensure that coders were entirely blind to 
the experimental hypotheses, they did not answer the full 
questionnaire. Instead, all six coders watched all the videos, 
but each pair of coders answered questions relating to one of 
three constructs (elaborated below), and did so indepen-
dently from one another.2
Measures. To assess participants’ observed perception of a 
changing world, we adapted items used in Hong and Chiu 
(1999) to form a three-item scale. Items appraised coders’ 
interpretation of interviewees’ perception of a changing 
world in general (e.g., “To what extent do you believe that 
the interviewee thinks that what has been in the past will 
continue in the future and there is no way to really change the 
future”). Answers ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 
(strongly agree) and items were reversed to reflect the extent 
interviewees are seen to perceive the world as changing.
To assess levels of participants’ observed hope for peace 
in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, we used a five-item scale, 
adapted from the work of Beck et al. (1974) and Long (1978). 
Items (e.g., “To what extent do you think that when the inter-
viewee thinks about the future of the conflict, he/she imag-
ines a situation which is better than now,” “To what extent do 
you think that the interviewee is hopeful regarding the end of 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict”) ranged from 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 6 (strongly agree).
To assess observed support for concessions, we used a 
two-item scale based on the work of Cohen-Chen and col-
leagues (2014). Items tapped into coders’ perception of the 
extent to which interviewees support two major concessions 
regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (“withdrawing to 
1967 borders with territorial exchanges,” “concessions 
regarding Jerusalem”). Answers ranged from 1 (strongly 
oppose) to 6 (strongly support) indicating to what extent 
people support concessions to be made by Israel. After exam-
ining the reliability for each coder (α > .76 in all cases) and 
Belief in a
changing world
Hope regarding
the Israeli-
Palesnian
Conflict
Support for
Concession-
Making
Figure 1. The changing world hypothesis applied to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
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the internal consistency between the two coders (α > .51 in 
all cases), we computed the mean of both coders’ scales as 
the final step and utilized these measures for the analysis.
Results and Discussion
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations 
among variables are presented in Table 1. A significant posi-
tive association was found between a belief in a changing 
world and observed hope (r = .76, p < .001), indicating that 
when people are perceived by others as holding a belief in a 
changing world, they are also perceived as hopeful regarding 
peace in the specific conflict. Due to the high correlation 
between the two variables, an exploratory factor analysis 
with oblique rotation was conducted. The factor analysis 
established the differentiation between items assessing belief 
in a changing world, hope, and observed support for conces-
sions. The analysis yielded a three-factor solution, with the 
corresponding items loading on three separate dimensions 
(loadings .86 or above). In addition, we conducted a confir-
matory factor analysis in Structural Equation Modeling 
(SEM). Results showed that a three-factor solution (χ2 = 
43.76, p = .08, root mean square error approximation 
[RMSEA] = .14) fit our data better than a two-factor solution 
(χ2 = 67.91, p = .000, RMSEA = .23), and a one-factor solu-
tion (χ2 = 86.72, p = .000, RMSEA = .28). This coincided 
with our theoretical approach, by which the perception of a 
changing world is an overall, general belief, while hope is a 
discrete emotion specific to a certain situation, namely peace 
in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.
In addition, perceived belief in a changing world was 
associated with perceived support for concessions (r = .39, 
p = .08). A significant positive correlation was also found 
between observed hope and observed support for conces-
sions (r = .55, p < .001), indicating that the more hopeful 
interviewees were seen to be, the more they were judged to 
be supportive of concessions.
Mediational analysis. A mediation model was examined using 
Hayes (2013) bootstrapping Process for SPSS (Model 4), to 
determine whether observed belief in a changing world was 
associated with increased levels of perceived hope, and thus 
to higher levels of observed support for concessions. Results 
(Figure 2) revealed that the relationship between interview-
ees’ observed belief in a changing world and observed 
support for concessions (b = .25, SE = .14, t = 1.80, p = .08) 
was reduced after the hope variable was included in the 
model (b = −.04, SE = .19, t = −.19, p = .84) and that the 
indirect effect through hope was significant (a*b: .289; 95% 
confidence interval [CI] = [0.023, 0.595]).
Path analysis. Path analysis was computed to examine 
whether our hypothesized model was indeed the most con-
sistent with the data. The model fitted the data well 
(χ2 = 0.04, p = .84, comparative fit index [CFI] = 1.00, and 
RMSEA = .000) compared with alternative models.3
These findings lend preliminary support to the Changing 
World Hypothesis: that hope regarding peace is predicted by 
a belief in a changing world, and that hope is associated with 
higher support for concession-making. Mediational analysis 
indicated that hope mediated the link between observed 
belief in a changing world and increased support for compro-
mise. This study demonstrated that belief in a changing 
world, hope for peace and concession-making are intuitively 
associated with one another when observing people discuss-
ing the conflict. As such, this study addresses an important 
need (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Funder, 2001), by 
which observing behavior should be used to understand 
social phenomena. However, as our hypotheses deal with 
personal perceptions and emotional experiences, the next 
step was to examine whether these associations would be 
found when measuring self-perceptions.
Study 2: Correlational
The goal of Study 2 was to examine the relationship between 
self-reported belief in a changing world, hope regarding 
peace, and support for concessions. We aimed to replicate the 
relationships observed in Study 1, while increasing control 
of our research environment and adding internal validity to 
our findings. For this purpose, we conducted a correlational 
study using self-reported measures of a belief in a changing 
world, levels of hope experienced with relation to peace in 
the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, and support for concessions 
on relevant issues of the conflict.
Method
Participants and procedure. Two hundred and forty Jewish 
Israelis (41% male, mean age 36.29, SD = 14.60) were asked 
Table 1. Correlations Between Observed Belief in a Changing World, Hope, and Support for Concessions.
M (SD) SE Confidence intervals Range 1 2 3
1. Changing world 3.58 (1.46) .31 [3.14, 4.32] 3.83 —  
2. Hope 3.67 (1.50) .34 [2.99, 4.31] 4.20 .76**  
3. Concessions 4.3 (0.88) .19 [3.91, 4.65] 3.00 .39 .55** –
Note. Boldface indicates statistical significance.
*p < .05 level. **p < .01 level (two-tailed).
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to fill in a short questionnaire. One hundred and nineteen 
were students from various academic tracks (including eco-
nomics, law, government, and communications) in the Inter-
disciplinary Center, Herzliya. Students were addressed 
during the end of class and filled in the questionnaire in 
return for entering a raffle. One hundred and twenty one par-
ticipants were recruited using an online survey platform in 
return for approximately US$1. In terms of political orienta-
tion, 39% indicated their political orientation as Rightist/
Hawkish, 30% stated they were Centrists, and 31% indicated 
they were Leftist/Dovish.
Measures. In this study, measures were worded as self-reports 
as opposed to interpretational or observational assumptions 
about someone else. To assess participants’ belief in a chang-
ing world, we used the same three-item scale as the one used 
in Study 1 (α = .72).
To assess the extent to which people experienced hope 
regarding peace in the future of the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict, we used the five-item scale used in Study 1 (α = .88). To 
assess support for concessions, we used the same two-item 
scale used in the previous study (α = .83).
As control variables, we measured age, gender, and self-
reported political orientation.
Results and Discussion
Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations (as 
well as standard error means, CIs, and range) among vari-
ables are presented in Table 2. In line with our hypothesis, 
belief in a changing world was found to be positively associ-
ated with hope (r = .45, p < .001). Once again, to distinguish 
belief in a changing world from the hope and support for con-
cessions variables, an exploratory factor analysis with oblique 
rotation was used. The analysis yielded a clear three-factor 
solution, with the corresponding items loading on three sepa-
rate dimensions (loadings .76 or above), supporting the exis-
tence of two separate constructs. In addition, the correlation 
was lower than the accepted level for multi-collinearity, 
which is .7 (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). Belief in a chang-
ing world was also positively associated with concessions (r = 
.17, p = .01), indicating that the more people hold a belief in a 
changing world, the more they are willing to make conces-
sions. In addition, a significant positive correlation was found 
between hope for peace and support for concessions (r = .49, 
p < .001), indicating that the more hopeful participants felt 
regarding the possibility of ending the conflict, the more they 
were willing to make concessions to achieve this resolution.
Interaction effects. No interaction effects of belief in a chang-
ing world and political orientation (β = .07, p = .20), gender 
(β = .13, p = .51), and age (β = .003, p = .66) were found on 
support for concessions, indicating that a belief in a changing 
world is associated with higher support for concessions, 
regardless of peoples’ political orientation, gender, and age.
Mediational analysis. A mediation model was examined using 
Hayes (2013) bootstrapping Process for SPSS (Model 4), to 
determine whether belief in a changing world was associated 
with support for concessions through increased levels of hope 
about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict specifically. Results 
revealed that the relationship between belief in a changing 
world on support for concessions (b = .24, SE = .09, t = 2.61, 
p = .01) was weakened after the hope variable was included in 
the model (b = −.10, SE = .09, t = −1.12, p = .26) and that the 
indirect effect through hope was significant (a*b: .346; 95% 
CI = [0.238, 0.473]). Thus, hope mediated the relationship 
between a belief in a changing world and support for core con-
cessions (Figure 3). The indirect effect remained significant 
when controlling for age, gender, and political orientation.
Path analysis. Path analysis was computed to examine whether 
our hypothesized model was indeed the most consistent with 
the data. The model fitted the data well (χ2 = 1.26, p = .26, 
CFI = .998, and RMSEA = .033) compared with alternative 
models.4
Observed Belief  
in a Changing 
World 
Observed 
Hope
Observed Support 
for Concessions
.76**
.59**
.39 (-.06)
Figure 2. Indirect effect of belief in a changing world on perceived support for concessions through observed hope.
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These results further supported the Changing World 
Hypothesis: Participants who held a general belief in a 
changing world tended to experience higher levels of hope 
for peace, leading to more support for concessions. 
Importantly, this relationship was consistent for people 
adhering to different ideological views. These findings con-
stitute a promising, though not a causal, indication of this 
association. We therefore aimed to examine whether belief in 
a changing world could be manipulated in Study 3.
Study 3: Experimental
The aim of Study 3 was to examine whether the associations 
found in Study 2 indicated a causal path. To address this 
goal, we used an experimental design to induce either a gen-
eral belief in a changing world or a belief in an unchanging 
world. In both conditions, participants read seemingly cred-
ible information in the form of a news article discussing new 
research that supported either the ever-changing nature of 
the world, or its unchanging nature (for similar approaches 
in conflict research, see Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Halperin 
et al., 2012; Halperin et al., 2011). Next, we measured levels 
of hope for peace and in turn, support for concessions. We 
expected to find a similar pattern to the one found previ-
ously, such that participants in the Changing World condi-
tion would be more willing to make concessions toward 
peace relative to participants in the Unchanging World con-
dition, and that this effect would be mediated by increased 
levels of hope for peace.
Method
Participants and procedure. Fifty-three participants (73% 
male; mean age = 28.5, SD = 11.36) were passengers 
recruited randomly on the Tel-Aviv Be’er-Sheva train. In 
terms of political orientation, our sample leaned to the right, 
making the challenge of inducing hope and concession-mak-
ing more difficult. 44% of participants indicated they were 
Rightist/Hawkish, 46% stated they were centrists, and 10% 
stated they were Leftist/Dovish.
Procedure. Participants were approached on the train and 
asked to fill in a survey on attitudes regarding relevant issues. 
Though the train ride itself takes approximately 1.5 hr, there 
is a 20-min interval with no stops, during which we conducted 
the study uninterrupted. Participants were asked to fill in two 
short questionnaires, seemingly unrelated to one another and 
put together for administrative purposes. The first part was 
presented as a reading comprehension test. Participants read a 
short text, designed to look like an article published in YNET.
co.il, a leading Israeli online news website, and answered a 
few questions regarding the text, intended to eliminate those 
Table 2. Correlations Between Belief in a Changing World, Imagining the Future, Hope, and Concessions.
M (SD) SE Confidence intervals Range 1 2 3 4 5
1. Changing world 4.09 (1.07) .07 [3.95, 4.21] 5 __  
2. Hope 4.04 (1.27) .08 [3.87, 4.19] 5 .45**  
3. Concessions 3.18 (1.56) .10 [3.00, 3.39] 5 .17** .49**  
4. Age 36.28 (14.60) .95 [34.36, 38.2] 54 −.15* −.09 −.02  
5. Gender (+F) 1.59 (0.49) .03 [1.53, 1.65] 1 −.04 .11 −.13* −.25**  
6. Political stance (+L) 3.85 (1.28) .08 [3.69, 4.01] 6 .21** .57** .63** −.08 .08
Note. Boldface indicates statistical significance.
*p < .05 level. **p < .01 level (two-tailed).
Belief
in a Changing 
World
Hope 
Support for 
Concessions
.45** 
.53** 
.17** (-.07) 
Figure 3. Indirect effect of belief in a changing world on support for concessions through hope.
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who did not read the manipulation from the database. The 
second part, including our mediating and dependent vari-
ables, was then presented to participants as a survey meant to 
examine Israelis’ opinions and attitudes regarding relevant 
political issues.
Changing versus unchanging world manipulation. Participants in 
both conditions read an article about a new study meant to 
develop a measure to examine, analyze, and map the extent to 
which the world is dynamic and ever-changing (“For the past 
20 years, Professor Gerald Owen and his colleagues . . . have 
dedicated themselves to create a measure of our world’s dyna-
mism.”). Both articles did not refer to Israel, to the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, or to conflict situations in general.
Participants in the Changing World condition (n = 25) 
learned that the study’s results indicate that social and 
political realities are dynamic (“Our team has found a dis-
tinct trend . . . social and political situations are dynamic; 
they change constantly . . . We have found that the level of 
dynamism . . . fluctuates between 72 and 89.”). However, 
those in the Unchanging World condition (n = 28) learned 
that overall, the world does not change and that reality is 
stable over time (“Our team has found a distinct trend . . . 
situations are stable; they stay fixed and stable over time, 
and trends of change are small and insignificant compared 
to the bigger picture, which is basically stationary . . . We 
have found that the level of dynamism fluctuates between 
5 and 10.”).
Pilot study. Because we did not want to reveal our study’s 
underlying goal, we ran a separate, preliminary pilot study to 
establish the effect of our changing world narrative on belief in 
a changing world. We used an online survey platform, and par-
ticipants (n = 70) were paid approximately US$1 to first read 
the manipulations, followed by statements regarding the belief 
in a changing world from Study 2. Results showed that our 
manipulation led participants in the Changing World condition 
to perceive the world as more dynamic and changing (M = 
4.25, SD = .97) compared with those in the Unchanging World 
condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.13) at t(68) = 3.46, p = .001, CI = 
[0.35, 1.35]; d = .83. Thus, we established that our changing 
world manipulation convinced people that the world is 
dynamic. In addition, power analysis based on the effect size, 
a standard power of .80, and an alpha of .05 from the pilot 
enabled us to determine the sample size (above 24 partici-
pants), which we utilized for the subsequent studies.
Measures. To assess participants’ levels of hope for peace, 
we used the same five-item scale used in the previous study 
(α = .87). To assess support for concessions, we formed a 
similar two-item scale as the previous study (α = .77), 
addressing the same two core issues of borders and Jerusa-
lem, though the second item was worded slightly differently. 
As in the previous study, we measured age, gender, and self-
reported political orientation.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation effects. Consistent with our hypothesis, although 
the manipulation presented the world in general as dynamic 
and did not refer to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict specifically, 
it transformed into an experience of hope that was signifi-
cantly higher (M = 4.23, SD = .93) compared with those in the 
static condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.41), t(51) = −2.4, p = .02, CI 
= [0.11, 1.45]; d = .65. A similar effect was found regarding 
participants’ support for concessions, t(51) = 2.27, p = .03, CI 
= [0.09, 1.52]; d = .63. This relatively simple, general manipu-
lation led those who read a dynamic message to be signifi-
cantly more supportive of Israel making major concessions at 
the core of the conflict (M = 2.86, SD = 1.38) compared with 
those in the static condition (M = 2.05, SD = 1.20).
Interaction effects. No interaction effects of the manipulation 
and political orientation (β = −.09, p = .81), age (β = .03, p = 
.38), and gender (β = −.83, p = .36) were found on the depen-
dent variable, indicating that the changing world manipula-
tion induced support for concessions, regardless of 
participants’ political stance, age, and gender.
Mediational analysis. A mediation model was examined using 
Hayes (2013) bootstrapping Process for SPSS (Model 4), to 
determine whether the general changing world manipulation 
led participants to experience increased levels of hope for 
peace, and thus to higher support for concessions in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Results revealed that the effect 
of the manipulation on support for concessions (b = .81, SE = 
.35, t = 2.27, p = .03) was reduced after hope was included in 
the model (b = .31, SE = .30, t = 1.02, p = .31) and that the 
indirect effect through hope was significant (a*b: .499; 95% 
CI = [0.120, 0.953]). Thus, hope mediated the effect of the 
changing world manipulation on support for concessions 
(Figure 4). When controlling for political orientation, age 
and gender, a similar trend was found, in which hope reduced 
the manipulation effect on concession-making.
Mediational analysis indicated that this simple manipula-
tion, discussing the world in general, induced concessions 
through an increased experience of hope for peace in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In addition, this manipulation 
affected support for concessions regardless of participants’ 
political stance, even though our sample included a large 
number of rightist participants. Nevertheless, we were con-
cerned that the text itself was explicit, presenting participants 
with the message that the world is changing (vs. unchang-
ing), as a scientific and undisputable truth. We wanted to cre-
ate a more viable intervention that simply draws upon 
people’s personal experiences as opposed to an artificial 
message. This was the aim of Study 4.
Study 4: Intervention
In Study 3, the manipulation successfully induced a belief in 
a changing world by presenting participants with a concrete 
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message of the world’s dynamic nature. As our goal was to 
create an applicable template for an intervention, a task 
based on a mock research report, while indicating a mecha-
nism, would be inappropriate as an intervention. Rather, it is 
important to promote a belief in a changing world in a way 
that is patently veridical in nature. We therefore developed a 
new approach that was rooted instead in the individual par-
ticipating. To do this, we asked participants to visually depict 
their perception of a changing world in a drawing. Our rea-
soning was that, by asking people to draw their own depic-
tion of the world as changing, this would not only afford the 
intervention a fundamental and basic sense of truth but also, 
by virtue of its self-generated nature, provide the strongest 
impact on broader perceptions.
Method
Participants and procedure. Seventy (of which 4 were 
excluded for reasons stated below) participants (59% male; 
mean age 26.99, SD = 9.47) were recruited on the Tel-Aviv 
Be’er-Sheva train (n = 52), as well as on the Interdisciplinary 
Center, Herzliya campus (n = 18). In terms of political orien-
tation, 44% of participants indicated they were Rightist/
Hawkish, 39% stated they were centrists and 18% stated they 
were Leftist/Dovish, a distribution which reflects Israeli 
society to some extent.
Procedure. The procedure was identical to the one described 
in Study 3.
Changing versus unchanging world intervention. For both 
experimental conditions, the first part was presented as a 
study regarding associations conveyed through drawing con-
cepts. Participants were presented with two sentences and 
asked to depict their first associations in a drawing (“Studies 
show that people have very different associations regarding 
the same concepts . . . We ask that you depict the following 
sentences in a drawing . . . Take a moment to think about the 
meaning of this idea to you, and then draw it inside the 
box.”). Participants in the Changing World condition (n = 
31) were asked to depict the sense that “Our world is dynamic 
and changing” and “Situations change over time,” while 
those in the Unchanging World condition (n = 35) were asked 
to depict in their drawings the sense that “Our world is stable 
and unchanging” and “Situations do not change over time.” 
The second part was then presented later in the session as a 
separate survey meant to examine Israelis’ opinions and atti-
tudes on relevant political issues. This section included our 
mediating and dependent variables, described below.
Measures. To assess participants’ experience of hope regard-
ing peace, we used the same five-item scale used in the pre-
vious studies (α = .76). As in all previous studies, concessions 
(α = .68) referred to two core issues of the conflict: borders 
and territory swaps, and the issue of Jerusalem. As in the 
previous study, we measured age, gender, and self-reported 
political orientation.
Results and Discussion
In total, we excluded four participants, who were recoded as 
missing values. Two failed to read the questions thoroughly, 
and two had out-of-range values.
Manipulation effects. To establish the effect of our graphic 
manipulation, we asked two external coders, who were blind 
to the conditions, to rate each drawing from 1 (completely 
static) to 6 (completely dynamic). Drawings in the Changing 
World condition included themes such as fluctuating graphs, 
the world revolving, and seasons changing (see reproduced 
Illustrations A and B in Figure 5). Drawings in the Unchang-
ing World condition included themes such as stable timelines 
and graphs, and shapes remaining constant (see reproduced 
Illustrations C and D in Figure 5).
We then computed internal reliability between the two 
coders (α > .72), and computed a scale out of the two 
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Figure 4. Indirect effect of changing world manipulation on support for concessions through hope.
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Figure 5. Reproduced illustrations of association-based drawings for the Changing World and Unchanging World conditions.
Note. To establish the effect of our graphic manipulation, we asked two external coders, who were blind to the conditions, to rate each drawing from 1 
(completely static) to 6 (completely dynamic). Sentences (indicating the dynamic or static condition) which participants were asked to depict were erased. 
The drawings were then shown to the coders, who indicated to what extent each drawing is dynamic. We then computed internal reliability between the 
two coders (α > .72), and computed a scale out of the two averaged items (α = .80). Results showed that participants in the dynamic condition depicted 
the world as changing (M = 3.70, SD = 1.62) compared with those in the unchanging condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.30) at t(63) = −3.17, p = .002, CI = 
[−1.87, −0.42]; d = .78. Thus, we established that our intervention indeed led people to depict the world as dynamic.
averaged items (α = .80). Results showed that participants in 
the dynamic condition depicted the world as changing (M = 
3.70, SD = 1.62) compared with those in the unchanging con-
dition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.30) at t(63) = −3.17, p = .002, CI = 
[−1.87, −0.42]; d = .78. Thus, we established that our inter-
vention indeed led people to depict the world as dynamic.
The task referred to the participants’ perception of the 
world in general as changing or unchanging, and did not imply 
the direction of the change: positive or negative. Nonetheless, 
an independent t test revealed that it led participants in the 
Changing World condition to express significantly higher lev-
els of hope (M = 4.41, SD = .89) compared with those in the 
Unchanging World condition (M = 3.89, SD = 1.01) at t(64) = 
−2.21, p = .03, CI = [−0.99, −0.05]; d = .55. In addition, par-
ticipants in the Changing World condition were more support-
ive of concession-making (M = 3.66, SD = 1.34) compared 
with the Unchanging World condition (M = 2.89, SD = 1.50; 
t(64) = −2.20, p = .03, CI = [−1.48, −0.07]; d = .54).
Interaction effects. Once again, no interaction effects of the 
intervention and political orientation (β = .08, p = .83), 
gender (β = −.02, p = .98), and age (β = .05, p = .18) were 
found on support for concessions.
Mediational analysis. In light of these findings and previous 
studies, we examined whether the changing world interven-
tion affected support for concessions through hope for peace 
(Figure 6). A mediation model was examined using Hayes 
(2013) bootstrapping Process for SPSS (Model 4). The anal-
ysis revealed that the direct effect of the task on support for 
concessions (b = .78, SE = .35, t = 2.20, p = .03) was reduced 
after hope was included in the model (b = .41, SE = .33, t = 
1.27, p = .21) and that the indirect effect through hope was 
significant (a*b: .362; 95% CI = [0.075, 0.797]). When con-
trolling for political orientation, age, and gender, a similar 
trend was found, in which hope reduced the intervention’s 
effect on concession-making.
In this study, we successfully induced hope for peace 
using a simple and general intervention task in which the 
world as changing was depicted. Here, not only was no men-
tion made of the conflict but also no concrete message was 
presented to participants as reliable. However, we wanted to 
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examine whether the perception of a changing world would 
induce hope and support for concessions compared with a 
control condition. This was the aim of Study 5.
Study 5: Inducing Hope Compared 
With Baseline
In previous studies, we demonstrated the effectiveness of 
instilling a perception of the world as changing in promoting 
hope and conciliatory attitudes. This dynamic perception was 
compared with the opposite perception: that the world is 
unchanging and static. As such, in this study, we aimed to 
induce hope compared with a control condition that was unre-
lated to the concept of a changing world. This was to demon-
strate that the perception of a changing world induces hope in 
intractable conflict, rather than the perception of an unchanging 
world depressing hope. To this end, we conducted an experi-
mental study at a time of conflict escalation, using the changing 
world manipulation from Study 3 and comparing it with a con-
trol condition unrelated to a changing world. We expected to 
find that even in times of escalating conflict, participants in the 
Changing World condition would be more willing to make con-
cessions toward peace, relative to participants in the control 
condition, mediated by increased levels of hope for peace.
Method
Participants and procedure. Eighty-eight participants (50% male; 
mean age = 40.45, SD = 14.17) were recruited using an online 
survey platform. In terms of political orientation, our sample 
leaned to the right, making the challenge of inducing hope and 
concession-making more difficult. In all, 45.5% of participants 
indicated they were Rightist/Hawkish, 45.5% stated they were 
centrists, and 9% stated they were Leftist/Dovish.
Procedure. The procedure was similar to Study 3, but partici-
pants were sent an online link to the questionnaire and were 
paid approximately US$1 in return. While those in the chang-
ing world condition read the same article as in Study 3, par-
ticipants in the control group read an article discussing the 
importance of the shape and color of generic drugs to contin-
ued usage. After reading the article, participants were pre-
sented with a seemingly unrelated study that included the 
mediating and dependent variables.
Measures. We used the same measures for hope (α = .84) and 
support for concessions (α = .86) as the previous study and 
measured age, gender, and self-reported political orientation.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation effects. In total, we removed seven participants 
from the analysis. Two participants had out-of-range values. 
In addition, because the study was conducted online from 
home, we wanted to ensure that participants took the study 
seriously. Three participants failed to follow instructions (one 
spent less than 1 min completing the study while another 
spent more than 40 min; one participant was suspected of not 
reading the questions properly and answered similar ques-
tions oppositely). Finally, 2 participants guessed the study’s 
goal.
Consistent with our hypothesis, although the manipula-
tion presented the world in general as changing, and even in 
a time of conflict escalation, it transformed into an experi-
ence of hope that was significantly higher (M = 3.64, SD = 
1.11) compared with those in the control condition (M = 
3.12, SD = 1.21), t(79) = −2.00, p = .049, CI = [−0.003, 
−1.03]; d = .44). A similar effect was found regarding partici-
pants’ support for concessions, t(79) = 2.37, p = .02, CI = 
[−0.12, −1.36]; d = .52. This relatively simple, very general 
manipulation referring to the world led those who read a 
dynamic message to be significantly more supportive of 
Israel making concessions (M = 3.19, SD = 1.39) compared 
with the control condition (M = 2.45, SD = 1.45).
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Figure 6. Indirect effect of changing world intervention on support for concessions through hope.
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Interaction effects. Once again, no interaction effects of the 
manipulation and political orientation (β = −.01, p = .97), 
gender (β = −.75, p = .23), and age (β = −.008, p = .73) were 
found on the dependent variable.
Mediational analysis. A mediation model was examined using 
Hayes (2013) bootstrapping Process for SPSS (Model 4), to 
determine whether the changing world manipulation led to 
higher support for concessions in the Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict through the heightened experience of hope for peace 
(Figure 7). Results revealed that the effect of the changing 
world manipulation on concessions (b = .74, SE = .31, t = 
2.36, p = .02) was reduced after hope was included in the 
model (b = .37, SE = .26, t = 1.43, p = .16) and that the indi-
rect effect through hope was significant (a*b: .368; 95% 
CI = [0.039, 0.758]).
These findings demonstrate that hope mediated the effect 
of the changing world manipulation on support for conces-
sions compared with the unrelated control condition. When 
controlling for political orientation, age, and gender, a simi-
lar trend was found, in which hope reduced the manipula-
tion’s effect on concession-making. Although effects were 
slightly weaker than those found in the previous studies, 
when considering that this was compared with an unrelated 
control condition (and not an unchanging world message), 
and that it was administered during a time of escalation, we 
believe it has important implications.
General Discussion
One of the greatest barriers to resolving intractable conflicts, 
one which leads to apathy and indifference, is the perception 
that the conflict is inherently unresolvable (Bar-Tal, 2007; 
Kriesberg, 1993). This belief stems from the perception of the 
conflict as unchanging, and results in its perpetuation and con-
tinuation. Transforming the perception of the future from iden-
tical to the negative present to different (and potentially better) 
could potentially induce hope regarding peace. However, how 
can people hope for a better future if they perceive the world in 
general as inherently stable? Our five studies addressed these 
issues in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, a par-
ticularly prominent example of a protracted, ongoing conflict.
Results from the first, observational study showed that 
when watching people describe the future of the Israeli–
Palestinian conflict, people perceived to hold a dynamic per-
ception of the world were perceived as more hopeful and 
supportive of concession-making when coders were blind to 
the study’s assumptions. In the second, correlational study we 
examined these associations when asking participants to report 
their own perceptions, emotions, and attitudes. Results indi-
cated that participants who believe that the world is ever-
changing were also more hopeful regarding peace in the 
Israeli–Palestinian conflict. This was associated with higher 
support for concessions regarding the negotiation process. 
Next, we wanted to establish our proposed model’s causal 
direction. Therefore, in Study 3, we used a narrative manipula-
tion, providing participants with seemingly reliable informa-
tion instilling the perception of the world as changing (vs. 
unchanging). In Study 4, we developed an applicable interven-
tion, using a self-generated depiction of a changing world to 
induce hope for peace. Finally, in Study 5, we replicated the 
effect of the changing world manipulation compared with a 
baseline during a time of conflict escalation. In all experimen-
tal studies, though no mention was made of the outgroup 
(Palestinians), the specific conflict (Israeli–Palestinian con-
flict), or even conflict situations in general, inducing a belief in 
a changing world led to greater support for concession-making, 
and this effect was mediated by hope for peace. Taken together, 
these five studies point to a mechanism underlying hope for 
peace, in which an increased perception of the world’s ever-
changing nature indirectly turned into hope for peace, leading 
to changes in political attitudes required to promote peace.
This research holds a number of important strengths. The 
first refers to the fact that these attitudinal changes were 
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Figure 7. Indirect effect of changing world manipulation (vs. control) on support for concessions through hope.
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achieved in such a difficult political context. We believe this 
is especially notable as such attitudes have traditionally been 
perceived as extremely immutable within intractable con-
flicts. Another strong point is the multi-methodological 
approach used to examine our hypotheses, including obser-
vational, correlational, and experimental designs. The impor-
tance of conducting studies whose findings can be generalized 
to the real world and allow for causal inferences has been 
noted in psychological literature (Baumeister et al., 2007; 
Funder, 2001). In this article, we included both approaches; 
while the observational design provided external validity, the 
correlational study enabled us to add a level of control by 
utilizing self-reported measures. The three experimental 
studies established causality, showing that it is the perception 
of the world as dynamic underlying hope and driving the 
process, adding internal validity, and developing an applica-
ble intervention for ameliorating intergroup conflict.
Another of this research’s strengths is the indirect way in 
which hope was induced. Previous, cognitive-based inter-
ventions to reduce prejudice have used direct reference to the 
outgroup as well as the conflict situation in an attempt to 
decrease anxiety and promote intergroup relations (e.g., 
Crisp & Turner, 2009; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hodson, 
Choma, & Costello, 2009). Direct reference to the outgroup 
has been found to be problematic within the context of 
intractable conflicts. In some cases it has proved unconvinc-
ing, while in others it triggered defensive reactions and atti-
tudes (Bar-Tal & Rosen, 2009; Epley et al., 2006; Galinsky 
et al., 2005; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009). We therefore focused 
our efforts on developing an indirect and general interven-
tion, in which the core appraisal of hope would be trans-
formed while bypassing any inverse reactions and emotions 
direct reference would induce.
Theoretical and Applied Significance
The efficacy of transforming emotions by changing general 
mind-sets has been established in a large number of con-
texts in the form of implicit theories (Dweck et al., 1995; 
Halperin et al., 2012; Halperin et al., 2011). However, while 
implicit theories denote specific “targets” (such as individ-
uals, groups, or conflicts), the concept of a changing world 
relates to reality as an overarching aggregation of situations 
that are ever-changing in their very nature. Second, while 
implicit theories typically concern beliefs about the held 
potential for change, belief in a changing world is a realis-
tic message, referring to change as constant. Third, since 
implicit theories are often directed at specific, very nega-
tive targets (like violent groups or conflicts), referring to 
change may in fact imply improvement. Belief in a chang-
ing world, on the other hand, is a neutral perception of the 
world as ever-changing, without inferring the direction of 
this change.
Support for our Changing World Hypothesis also has 
particular implications regarding the role of emotions in 
intractable intergroup conflicts. Although many studies 
have established the significance of emotions in conflict 
(e.g., Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de-Rivera, 2007; Halperin, 
2014; Kelman, 1997; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; 
Petersen, 2002; Staub, 2005; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 
2006) and its resolution (e.g., Halperin et al., 2012; Halperin 
et al., 2011; Reifen-Tagar, Halperin, & Federico, 2011), 
most have focused on negative emotions. Joining emerging 
work on emotions in conflict and conflict resolution, this 
research concentrates on hope, an emotion that has thus far 
received less attention (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; Saguy & 
Halperin, 2014). In addition, although hope has conceptu-
ally been established as pivotal to achieve peace (Bar-Tal, 
2001), the majority of empirical evidence has been descrip-
tive and correlational. Much work is needed to fully under-
stand the role of hope in conflict resolution, and ways to 
induce hope to promote peaceful attitudes. Importantly, 
these results uncover a new mechanism, grounded in theory 
and empirically demonstrated, whereby hope regarding the 
end of a specific conflict can be induced by prompting a 
perception of the world as changing, leading to change in 
political attitudes for peace.
This research holds implications within the field of social 
cognition and intergroup relations as well. An ample amount 
of research has established the idea that under certain circum-
stances, interventions transforming cognitive perceptions 
may prove highly effective in improving intergroup relations 
(Crisp et al., 2011; Hewstone, 1996). These include estab-
lished interventions such as imagined contact (Crisp & 
Turner, 2009, 2012), perspective taking (Dovidio et al., 2004; 
Galinsky, 2002; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), and interven-
tions based on the common ingroup identity model (Crisp & 
Hewstone, 2007; Dovidio et al., 2004; Dovidio et al., 2009; 
Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Although such interventions 
have proved highly successful, they were developed to 
improve intergroup relations, and thus target attitudes regard-
ing specific people or groups. As a result, they apply to emo-
tions, attitudes and behaviors whose “target” is the outgroup. 
The target upon which hope is focused, however, is a conflict 
perceived as irresolvable (Bar-Tal, 2007; Kriesberg, 1993). 
Therefore, within the context of intractable conflict, the per-
ception of irresolvability should receive more attention and 
be reflected in an intervention aimed at inducing hope. Herein 
lies another unique contribution of this study: In changing a 
general perception of the world as dynamic, hope for peace is 
not only enabled but also induced, changing despair into hope 
and support for peace-promoting policies.
In addition to their theoretical implications, our findings 
have applied relevance. Successful use of this simple chang-
ing world intervention may serve as a basis for a large range 
of educational programs and interventions to regulate and 
induce hope within conflict situations. Importantly, frequent 
application of a message to various contexts has been found 
to prolong the effect’s endurance over time (Yeager & 
Walton, 2011). Expanding and culturally adjusting these 
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simple yet scientifically grounded manipulations can serve 
as a basis for interventions that are applicable in various con-
flicts worldwide.
Limitations and Future Directions
Within the context of conflict, emotional reactions do not 
occur in a vacuum. When forming an appraisal and associ-
ated reaction to an event, and especially one related to con-
flict, people also consider the reaction of the opponent 
(Carnevale & Isen, 1986; Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 
2004). Thus, future studies should also examine the effect 
that expressions of hope (rather than the experience of hope) 
toward the rival has on conflict resolution.
By design, our studies focused on a particularly extreme 
type of intergroup conflict, namely, an intractable conflict. 
Because the current situation is so negative, it is possible that 
convincing people that change constantly occurs is, at its 
core, a positive message. It is therefore important to examine 
the effect of inducing a belief in a changing world within 
other contexts, including different (and maybe less extreme) 
forms of intergroup conflict. It is possible that when people 
perceive the present as positive or at least acceptable, the 
perception of the world as changing may induce uncertainty 
regarding the future, which may lead to actions aimed at 
maintaining the status quo.
In summary, this research illuminates a new mechanism 
for promoting peace through hope. We successfully increased 
hope for peace in a specific conflict by indirectly transform-
ing its core appraisal regarding irresolvability. The current 
research demonstrates that belief in a changing world can 
serve to increase the experience of hope for peace, with impli-
cations for the understanding of intergroup conflicts and their 
resolution, using emotions and their behavioral implications. 
These promising results challenge the traditional assumption 
that transforming attitudes within such severe contexts is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible. As such, this research 
contributes a novel dimension to the literatures on emotions, 
intergroup conflict, and conflict resolution. On a more applied 
level, these studies indicate a relatively simple and indirect 
strategy to induce hope, which is highly relevant to those who 
perceive promoting peace as a worthy endeavor.
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Notes
1. The Israeli–Palestinian International organization works on a 
number of levels including (a) individually tailored projects 
based on each side (Israeli and Palestinian) for raising aware-
ness and mobilization to end the conflict among both societ-
ies, (b) joint projects for Israelis and Palestinians for discussion 
and reconciliation, and (c) political activity to promote conflict 
resolution.
2. Coders were allowed to watch each video as many times as 
they wished but were required to fill in the questionnaire prior 
to moving on to the next video and directly after watching the 
video. After completing the entire study, coders’ access to the 
videos was removed, and the videos were taken offline to ensure 
interviewees’ privacy.
3. When adding the direct path from belief in a changing world 
to concessions, this path itself was non-significant (p = .84). 
To eliminate the possibility that it is hope which leads to a 
belief in a changing world, we also compared the aforemen-
tioned mediation model to an alternative model in which hope 
was the independent variable, leading indirectly to conces-
sion-making through belief in a changing world. This model 
did not fit the data well, χ2 = 3.79, p = .05, comparative fit 
index (CFI) = .862, and root mean square error approxima-
tion (RMSEA) = .383, suggesting that it is indeed belief in 
a changing world which drives the process, rather than other 
possible explanations.
4. When adding the direct path from belief in a changing world 
to concessions, this path was non-significant (p = .26). As in 
Study 1, to eliminate the possibility that it is hope for peace 
which leads to a belief in a changing world, we also com-
pared the aforementioned mediation model to an alternative 
model in which hope was the independent variable, leading 
indirectly to concession-making through belief in a chang-
ing world. This model did not fit the data well, χ2 = 62.75, p 
= .000, CFI = .472, and RMSEA = .508, indicating that our 
model was indeed the most consistent compared with other 
possible explanations.
Supplemental Material 
The online supplemental material is available at http://pspb. 
sagepub.com/supplemental.
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